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journalists and the Stirring of 
Australian Public Diplomacy 
David Lorve 
This chapter is a historical case study of public diplomacy 
spluttering into life. It focuses on the Colombo Plan for aid to 
South and Southeast Asia which began in the middle of 1951 
and continues, in diminished form, today. From an Australian 
perspective, the Colombo PIan can be seen as one of the few positive 
aspects of official policy towards this part of Asia during the 
1950s and 1960s-and rightly so, given the success of government 
sponsored education and training opportunities for Asian students 
to come to Australia-but the question of how Australians adjusted 
their behaviour to meet changing expectations that grew with 
the Colombo PIan requires further investigation. The case study 
I explore here, of a government-endorsed journalists' tour of 
South and Southeast Asia in 1958-59, is instructive both for what 
it reveals about a dawning sense the power of popularly digested 
stories and images to work two ways-at home and overseas-and 
also for the emergence of what might be called a human-story 
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aspect of cultural internationalism, associated with the Colombo 
Plan.1 
Those Australians most closely associated with the Colombo 
Plan in the early and mid-1950s were not slow to embark on 
information initiatives associated with it. As several historians 
have shown, and as David Walker has reminded us in relation to 
the Cheap Books scheme, those working with the public relations 
trained Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey launched 
ambitious information activities. An interdepartmental Overseas 
Planning Committee formed in 1955 oversaw many of these, 
emphasizing in its guidelines that Australia should be known 
as a non-threatening power that was also facing development 
challenges. 2 There was a Cold War "struggle for hearts and 
minds" dimension to some these, especially in the crafting of 
Radio Australia broadcasts and stories for Hemisphere, the new 
Asian/ Australian student magazine, and the provision of radio 
transmitters and receivers from the mid-1950s through the mid-
1960s.3 Partly for reasons of limited budgets and partly as a result 
1 Here I am telying on Akira Iriye's description of the evolution of 
internationalism, with cultural internationalism, uthe idea that 
internationalism may best be fostered through cross-national cultural 
communication, understanding and co-operation" being a major feature 
of 20th century internationalism-Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism 
and World Order, Baltimore: johns Hopkins UP, 1997, p. 27 and passim. 
2 "Cold War - Outline Notes - Working Paper" (author unknown), 23 
September 1955, CRS A 7452 item A359, NAA. 
3 See David Lowe, "The Colombo Plan and 'Soft' Regiona1ism in the Asia-
Pacific: Australian and New Zealand Cultural Diplomacy in the 1950s 
and 1906s," Alfred Deakin Research Institute Working Paper No. 1, G~elong, 
VIC: ADRI, 2010. <http:/ /www.deakin.edu.au/alfred-deakin-research-
institute/ assets/ resources/ publications/workingpapers/ adri-working-
paper-Ol.pdf>; and Daniel Oakman, Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo 
Plan, Canberra: Pandanus Booksf 2004. 
journalists and the Stirring of Australian Public Diplomacy 193 
of needs analyses, the Australians placed particular emphasis on 
sponsored studentships and traineeships-and these became the 
subject of much information dissemination. 
The role of journalists in general began to attract more 
attention; and Australia's Colombo Plan budget provided for a team 
of Indian newspaper editors to tour Australia, the first tour of its 
kind, in 1957. In the same year, the regular meeting of members 
of the Colombo Plan's Consultative Committee marked something 
of a new era in information activity. It featured strong consensus 
that members should do more to disseminate information about 
the plan through established information media-the press, radio 
and, where possible, television. 4 This meeting came at the end of 
the first phase of the plan, and so constituted something of a report 
card on the six-year development plans begun in 1951. Although 
the range of achievements and the effectiveness of aid programs 
varied considerably, as some na:tions joined the scheme later than 
others, there was a strong general desire to renew commitments 
and embark on second phase aid programs; and so the Colombo 
Plan began to undergo transformation from its post-war and 
post-independence circumstances to something more enduring, 
based on ongoing partnerships. The renewal and transformation 
also meant ongoing commitments by donor nations and next 
phase economic development and training efforts in recipient 
members; and so developed a consensus on the need to carry the 
good word about the plan's projects further, both at home and 
overseas. Information with a capital "I" was crucial to a broader-
based acc~ptance among peoples of both donor and recipient 
4 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information Officers, 
Singapore, 9-12 September 1958, Summaries of Proceedings, Texts of 
Speeches and Messages, and Conference Papers, Colombo Plan Bureau 
1958, pp. 95-97, CRS A6895 item NSS/137, NAA. 
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nations, of this transformation of the Colombo Plan from post-
war experiment to longer-term partnerships between the so-
called "old Commonwealth" nations, Japan and the United States, 
and developing riations of South and Southeast Asia (noting that 
some countries were both donors and beneficiaries of aid). 
The Colombo Plan therefore prompted the mobilisation 
of a new multi-national group of cultural ambassadors, the 
National Information officers of participating countries. The 
first meeting of national information officers was in September 
1958, in Singapore and was attended by representatives from 
seventeen member countries as well as the UN Department of 
Information, the WHO, and the Colombo Plan Bureau. The timing 
of the conference was important. Members were excited that the 
first film about the Colombo Plan, footage compiled in India from 
several sources, was due for release the next month; and it was 
to be followed by another made in Japan, with more from other 
members scheduled. 
Hunter Wade, the young New Zealand-born Director of 
the Colombo Plan Bureau, opened the conference with the 
declaration that although there was much that governments 
could boast in relation to the Colombo Plan, information work 
was about more than this; indeed it was "an integral part of the 
machinery of national development."5 He argued that sustained 
national development would only come about through individual 
and collective enterprise and this depended on thorough levels 
of understanding and discussion of the tasks at hand. More than 
others, Wade stressed the need to think of information as being at 
the heart of aid endeavours: 
5 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information Officers, op. cit., 
pp. 11-12. 
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To th~ extent the information activity in an under-
developed country can help mobilize popular support 
for a vigorous progran1n1e of econ01nic and social 
development, it is a productive activity of the utmost 
importance. In the same way, the work of information 
officers in the more highly developed countries can help 
to build up public support for a progranune of technical 
assistance and capital aid to the less developed countries. 
Both of these aspects of information work are of concern 
to the Colombo Plan which, in its widest sense, consists of 
the application of a blend of national effort and external 
aid to the developn1ent progran1n1es of the countries of 
the Colombo Plan area. 6 
Thereafter, delegates spent three and a half days feeling their way 
(this was, afterall, the first meting of its kind} through discussions 
about information technology and capacity and strategies, 
according to very different levels of capability among members. 
Chairman of the conference, Singapore's George Thomson, paid 
tribute to the collegiality and energy on display, marveling at 
delegates' capacity to reach the end of a full day and then face up 
to ten courses of Chinese food/ 
Leader of the Australian delegation and head of the Aqstralian 
News and Information Bureau, Mel Pratt stressed how much 
of his work was directed towards publicizing Colombo. Plan 
achievements and drew heavily on Colombo Plan students for its 
human interest factor. The results took the form of press reports, 
6 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information Officers, op. cit., 
Wade's vote of thanks at Opening Ceremony, p. 50. 
7 The Colomb.0 Plan Conference of National Information Officers, op. cit., 
p. 40 •. 
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films, photographs, radio stories and print booklets, and Pratt 
acknowledged the potential of television in Asia in years to come.s 
Not surprisingly, there were limits to what member nations 
might do by way of increased publicity. Many of those recipients of 
aid had underdev~loped communications infrastructure and were 
building cohorts of journalists able to transmit messages to diverse 
groups within their populations. Partly for this reason (and partly 
due to a shortage of newsprint), there was a tendency to invest big 
hopes in the power of the moving image. Films about the Colombo 
Plan would be able to transcend problems of literacy and stretch 
imaginations beyond local preoccupations. Representatives from 
donor countries such as Australia, Canada and UK promised more 
assistance with the production, distribution and showing of 
films, and their enthusiasm was shared by Indian delegate, M. L. 
Bhardwaj (also Government Registrar of Newspapers) and Colombo 
Plan Information Officer, R. K. Chatterjee-but recommendations 
embraced the full range of printJ poster, film and radio efforts. 
9-fowards the end of the meeting, delegates discussed a proposal 
from the Singapore delegation for there being declared a Colombo 
Plan Day for celebration in member countries, as another stage 
of conscious-raising. This idea enjoyed a. mixed reception, with 
the Australian Mel Pratt amongst the most enthusiastic. In fact, 
so enthusiastic was Pratt that he vowed to recommend it to his 
government whether or not it was taken up by others.10 
8 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information Officers, op. cit. 
pp. 13-14. 
9 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information officers, op. cit., 
pp. 26-30, p. 43. 
10 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information Officers, op. cit., 
pp. 37-38. 
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As the Singapore conference of Information officers was 
winding up, an Australian venture in information and publicity 
was taking shape. The Australian Department of External Affairs 
had secured the services of former war correspondent, Osmar 
White and cameraman james Fitzpatrick, to undertake an 
extended tour of Colombo Plan nations in South and Southeast 
Asia, for around six months, in order to collect human interest 
stoties for newspaper features-and the department had worked 
hard to secure syndication of stories among almost all of the 
major dailies in Australia; and to produce a booklet or booklets 
dealing with Australia's activities under the Colombo Plan.11 It was 
a grand tour with some elaborate orchestration, and a good touch 
of nerves in External Affairs about what the strong-willed White 
might discover and end up in his stories. White. and Fitzpatrick 
started their tour in Pakistan in December 1958 before making 
their way eastwards through the subcontinent towards Southeast 
Asia. By the time they completed their final visit, in Indonesia, 
they had toured all but two of the nations (Brunei and Laos) to 
which Australia was then providing aid.12 
The pace of the trip and the vagaries of weather and 
officialdom in different countries made it grueling, even for White, 
_who reported from Papua New Guinea during the Second World 
War. Jim Fitzpatrick wrote to his boss several updates in weary 
but defiant voice1 listing significant filming and photography 
· after being "whisked off on another bloody tiring trip some 
500 miles to the north [of Bangkok] by jeeps, lorries and little 
11 Record of Conversation in Dept of External Affairs, uVisit of journalist 
and Photographer to South and South East Asia, n 4 November 1958, CRS 
A6895 item NSS/134 part 1, NAA. 
12 Osmar White, ucolombo Plan Survey for Australian Press," 3. December 
1958 to 1 june 1959, p. 1, A10302 item 1959/170 part 2, NAA. . 
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planes."13 In addition to working hand-in-hand with White for 
newspaper features and planned moving picture films, Fitzpatrick 
kept shooting film for the Colombo Plan Library, too. His meeting, 
early on the tour, with the determined R. K. Chatterjee, no doubt 
contributed to this addition to the mission.14 He, more than White, 
was working as an ambassador for cultural internationalism, as he 
stretched beyond his government's brief. The two men were, in 
White's words, "the only two-man cinema circus extant."15 
In general, White was mostly sanguine about the impact of the 
Colombo Plan in South Asia and more encouraged by what he saw in 
Southeast Asia. From the Galle Face Hotel in Colombo two months 
into the tour, he wrote of having to restrain his newspaper man's 
instinct to Hscream his head off and be damned to the consequences" 
in relation to what he saw in Pakistan and India. There were a 
number of reasons behind this, not least White's lack of experience 
in South Asia, his culture shock at the extent of poverty he saw, 
his frustration with local officials, and the seeming insignificance 
of small amounts of Australian aid in this bigger picture. After 
something of a personal struggle, in which he seriously thought 
about going with instinct and penning savage accounts of waste, 
neglect and ineffectiveness in Pakistan and India, he adjusted to 
the novelty of what he was seeing and doing; and, with Casey's 
encouragetnent, adopted a compromise blend of reporting problems 
while anticipating better results-ahead.16 
13 Fitzpatrick's letter to. Pratt, Bangkok, 9 April 1959, CRS A6895 item 
NSB/134 part 2, NAA. 
14 R. K. Chatterjee's letter to Kevin Murphy, 9 March 1959, CRS A6895 item 
N58/134 part 2, NAA. 
15 Osmar_White's letter to Kevin Murphy, 27 February 1959, CRS A6895 item 
NSB/134 part 2, NAA. 
16 Osmar White, op. cit. 
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The many stories published in Australian newspapers then, 
met External Affairs' expectations admirably. Privately, as a former 
war correspondent, and someone who readily embraced Cold War 
polarity as a basis for Australia's efforts in Asia, White was inclined 
to slip into half-flippant~ rapidly-dating discourses and see the 
Colombo Plan as "the only effective weapon our mob has against 
the Comms in the Mysterious East."17 To be fair to White, Moscow 
had launched a vigorous propaganda campaign in South A-sia, and 
had undoubtedly enjoyed a Sputnik shot of extra momentum from 
October 1957. And to be fairto Canberra, before White and Fitzpatrick 
set off on their tour, Australian External Affairs officials had tried 
to play down the Cold War factor. In a pre-departure briefing, 
External Affairs officer Colin Moodie had steered conversation away 
from communism and from the idea of "buying goodwill." Moodie 
had stressed the value of the Colombo Plan in generating personal 
relationships between Asians and Australians.18 
White's analysis of the impact of the Colombo Plan was 
encouraging but sobering. His official report listed problems 
that led to waste of money, machinery or trainers' time, but 
was generally upbeat about the effect of the Colombo PIan on 
Australia's standing in the region-but at the level of officials and 
the educated elite rather than tnore broadly. While the Colombo 
Plan might counter some of the resentment generated by the 
"white Australia'' policy, it was less likely to do so where another 
significant grievance arose-such as Australia's resistance to 
Indonesian sovereignty in West New Guinea. And, longer term, he 
wrote, "Small Australian gifts to worthy enterprises of institutions 
17 Osmar White's letter to Kevin Murphy, 27 February 1959, op. cit. 
18 Record of conversation, between Moodie, White, Murphy and Pratt~ and 
three other DEA officers, 4 November 1958, CRS A6895 item N58/134 part 
1, NAA. 
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do not appear to have much psycho-political effect, or to have 
· much chance of creating such an effect unless their human 
interest value is exploited by a skilled, long-term programme of 
publicity and information. "19 
The print output for the tour was directed heavily towards 
Australians.· In addition to the regular news stories that appeared 
in several dailies, The Seed of Freedom booklet went to 20,000 State 
Schools in Australia, as well as a long list of libraries, youth and 
student group~, trade unions, churches, banks and parliaments. 20 
It was published in 1961, coinciding with the tenth anniversary 
of the Colombo Plan. Some 50,000 were initially produced for 
Australia; and a run of 20,000 was tailored for Malaya, Singapore 
and the Borneo Territories. In his foreword to the book, Australian 
Prime Minister Robert Menzies wrote of the need to get beneath 
the blueprints and statistics that dominated reports on the 
Colombo Plan and to recover the "human element." White's text 
and Fitzpatrick's photographs did just this. The opening pages of 
the booklet stressed the havoc wreaked by the Second World War, 
and, in a nod to the non-aligned movement, the logical emergence 
of new relationships and the threat of nuclear war. In particular, 
before moving to the particular needs and projects making up the 
"plan," White wrote of a unew concept of internationalism" as 
means .of orientation beyond imperialism and Cold War; 
The old internationalistn of empire was based on the 
political and economic subordination of subject peoples. 
The new ideological intema tionaHsm of Communis1n holds 
out the pron1ise of econon1ic and social developn1ent by 
19 uColombo Plan Suryey for Australian Press," report by Osmar White 
(undated, 1959), CRS Bl42 item 58/31. 
20 G. N. Upton, DEA, to K. Murphy, ANIB, 13 March 1961, CRS A6895 item 
NSS/164, NAA; Upton to K. Murphy, 15 March 1961, op. cit. 
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abandoning all forms of political freedom and by abolishing 
the individual's right of economic choice. The Colombo 
Plan postulates that an alternative internationalisn1 is 
possible-the internationalism of tnutual aid and co-
operation without the sacrifice of freedom. 21 
The connection between human interest stories and the new 
internationalism was popular refrain by this time, in both 
Austral~an and Colombo Plan meetings. As Phillip jones, 
representing Sarawak at the 1958 Information Officers meeting 
put it, "One student, one teacher, is for our present publicity 
purposes worth a dozen reactors and dams which cannot by any 
means yet be made to touch the hearts and minds of the people. "22 
Australia's much-heralded Colombo Plan tour yielded 
rich returns in film. Three extracts from The Builders, the main 
\ documentary film produced, were syndicated to the British and 
Canadian Broadcasting Commissions, the NHK National Network 
of] a pan, and one extract traveled to Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
France and Mexico. The full film became a television documentary 
screened throughout North America and Europe, and by March 
1960 it had reached fifteen European nations. So, a potential 
audience of 75 million viewers heard the narrator conclude by 
celebrating the four freedoms as the basis for the region's future, 
and gesture towards a new piuralism; 
The people of South, and of South-East Asia, are climbing 
out of the valley. Out of the valley of the past into a future 
of their own building. A building in which we, their 
friends and neighbours, are playing a part. This future 
21 Osmar White, The Seed o{Freedom: Australia and the Colombo Plan, Canberra: 
· AustraHan Government Printers, 1961, p. 3, p. 5. 
22 The Colombo Plan Conference of National Information Officers, op. cit., 
p. 84. 
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has its roots and foundations in freedom to worship, each 
after his own fashion; to give praise and thanks for the 
gift of life in a world of widening horizons. 23 
As the above list of countries suggests, it was easier to use outside of 
Asia, as the attempt ~o capture stories from many locations meant 
that official of any particular member nation was likely to feel 
that their experiences should have enjoyed greater prominence. 
Again, Australian schools were the main beneficiaries of renewed 
emphasis on' internal distribution. 24 
As a moment in documentary film-making this was a 
pioneering one. jim Fitzpatrick had been recruited to take still 
photos that would accompany White's newspaper articles. It was-
only an act of bravado that led him to lug along a movie camera, 
in the hope that he might be able to cajole White into making a 
two-man team do the work of what normally took eight. Although 
it is White's reporting of the trip, and White's newspaper stories, 
cthat dominate the record, Fitzpatrick's achievement in shooting 
and sending thousands of hours · of film material back was 
extraordinary. There was no budget for it, but the sheer volume 
of high quality material demanded attention; and upon return, 
Fitzpatrick managed to secure funds for both commentary and a 
musical score by the Sydney Symphonic Orchestra.25 Again, the 
Colombo Plan proved adept at preCipitating cultural exchange 
that might otherwise have felt too hard. 
23 K. Fraser to Mel Pratt, 7 May 1959, CRS A6895 item 58/134 part 2, NAA; 
. J. S. Allen to Director ANIB, 10 March 1960, op. cit.; text of narration for 
The Builders, undated, op. cit. 
24 john Murray (ANIB) to Lionel Wigmore, Australian High Commission, 
New Delhi, 14 September 1960, CRS A 6895 item N58/165 part 2, NAA. 
25 David Lowe1 Interview with james Fitzpatrick, Sydney, 24 September 
2003. 
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Reflections 
At a very general level, these activities matched the transition process 
of the Colombo Plan changing from postwar, post-independence to a 
more amorphous yet serious series of longer term partnerships. The 
Australian emphasis on education and training had a logic that was 
specific to circumstances; but, in a broader realm, it also straddled US 
President Harry Truman's Point Four aid initiative of 1949, bringing 
aid and scientific progress to countries most in need, and the later 
flurry of educational and intellectual exchange programs in the 1970s, 
taking shape in the German-Marshall Fund, the Japan Foundation 
and other new organizations. What I have tentatively called human-
story cultural internationalism was in part a response to the problem 
of managing geography, cultural difference and potentially soporific 
macro-economics in digestible way; and it carried a broader liberal 
impulse that survived and flourished after the Second World War 
into optimism about the impact of advances in communications 
technology baa to ab- call kar kethe kind of enthusiasm that relished 
wider use of the telephone, radio and cinema, and that awaited 
satellites to make simultaneous world-wide television viewing 
possible, as the Our World program achieved in 1967. 
Connecting this case study of pioneeringjournalists in the late 
1950s to current conversations about public diplomacy is arguably 
more ambitious; but something of a pathway is offered by Nicholas 
Cull's work connecting 45 years of the US Information Agency's 
work with key themes that run through most contemporary 
discussions. Cull's five core components of successful engaging 
with foreign publics are: listening; advocacy; cultural diplomacy; 
exchange diplomacy; and international broadcasting.26 
26 Nicholas]. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: 
American Propaganda and- Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2008, p. xv. 
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There are three big differences between Cull's exploration 
of the USIA and infurmation activity linked to the Colombo Plan 
in the late 1950s-early 1960s. One is the difficulty for Australians 
to address more than an educated elite with English literacy-
translation of print materials was expanding but only in recent 
years and not in volumes suggesting confidence. The lack of 
developed information infrastructure in many countries is 
another key difference. Print material, machinery relating to 
film, photography radio, and the power generation on which all 
of these depended, were at much lower levels than existed, for 
example, in communist Europe. 
And the persuasive effort directed internally, at Australians. 
marks the White-fitzpatrick tour as substantially different from 
Cull's USIA. In addition to those who knew too little, there was a 
critical public-or at least critical voices of influence-in Australia 
in the background to the White and Fitzpatrick tour. Newspaper 
editors grew anxious about spending on the Colombo Plan in the 
late 1950s. In particular, one disgruntled Australian, former UN 
F oodandAgricultural Organisation adviser, Reginald Cunningham, 
was a persistent complainant about waste under the Colombo 
Plan. Cunningham was actually trying hard to have himself 
appointed as an overseer of Australian aid, having fallen in love 
with the idea of living in Pakistan. In the meantime, during 1958, 
he became more vocal in press and on radio in Australia, creating 
headaches for External Affairs officers.27 Not surprisingly, then, 
27 D. 0. Hay, ucunningham: Points on Aid to Pakistan for use before foreign 
Affairs Committee," 26 March 1958, CRS Al0302 item 1959/170 part 2, 
NAA; Casey, "Press Release: Australian Colombo Plan Aid to Pakistan," 22 
April1958, op. cit.; Moodie to Casey, "R.E.G. Cunningham and the Colombo 
Plan," 14 May 1958, op. cit.; Cawthorn (Australian High Commissioner 
to Pakistan) to Moodie, 15 September 1958, op. cit.; Moodie to Casey, 
ucolombo Plan: Mr Cunningham," 7 August 1958, op. cit. 
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External Affairs saw the White-Fitzpatrick tour as an opportunity 
"to convince potential Australian critics of the value of the Plan in 
addition to informing the people in Australia who wanted to know 
something about it. "28 
In the wake of the tour, at the next meeting of Colombo Plan 
Information Officers, in 1960, Australians were able to boast "The 
seed of Freedom" as a major contribution to the tenth a,nniversary 
approaching; list more visits by and training for, Asian journalists, 
and boast translation of press material and pamphlets into 
Thai, Malay, Urdu, TamU, Vietnamese and Chinese languages. 
The Australians were committed to news around anniversaries; 
not just the Colombo Pian's tenth, but the arrival of the lOOOth 
Colombo Plan trainee, the 2000th trainee, and other milestones 
that could be found.~9 They were, by the early 1960s, very familiar 
with the notion of the journalists' "hook" on which to hang a 
story. 
Finally, it is important not to equate the amount of Australia's 
information activity in Asia with a sea-change in official attitudes, 
implying broad embrace of racial pluralism. This shift of mind-
set would come more gradually over the next decade., and, taking 
a cue from White and Fitzpatrick, we might credit the Colombo 
Plan efforts as "Builders" of bridges between the more liberal 
internationalists in Australia and the more Cold War realists. But 
there is a sense of becoming pro-active in Asia (the term ufollow-
28 Record of conversation, 1:-ch"een Moodie, White, Murphy and Pratt, and 
three other DEA officers, 4 November 1958, CRS A6895 item NSS/134 part 
1, NAA. 
29 Australian Answers to questionnaire, Colombo Plan Conference of" 
National Information Officers, Bangkok, 5-8 September 1960, CRS A 6895 
item N60/29, NM. 
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up" was emphasized in External Affairs1 hoped for the tour)30 that 
warrants exploration of the late 1950s-early 1960s in terms of 
public diplomacy. 
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